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EDITORIAL
Introduction: International Leadership in an Age
of American Retreat, Chinese Return and Global
Urgency
Ole Wæver1 • Zhimin Chen2
 Fudan University and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017
Donald J. Trump should be thanked for triggering this and the next special issue on
international leadership. We cannot bring ourselves to outright dedicate the two
issues to him, but he did get us started on the project. With the election in November
2016 of a US President with a highly dismissive attitude to international cooperation
and a transactionalist policy approach unlikely to form the basis for leadership, the
question posed itself: who then, if any? After US leadership, should we expect a
general ‘global leadership vacuum’ (Solana 2017), intensified conflict over
leadership, or is it more likely that as the US steps back, others will step forward?
China has been elevated to the position of global leader in many critical
comments after various moves by Trump, often as a way to taunt his policies as self-
defeating, harmful to the US and ‘‘making China great again’’. China’s President Xi
Jinping felt obliged to move forward to address the leadership vacuum. In particular,
his keynote address to the World Economic Forum in Davos on 17 January 2017
was noted for its full endorsement of globalization and a promise of China trying to
become the guardian of global cooperation. Forbes entertained the headline
‘‘Communist China Is Now The Leader Of The ‘Free Trade’ World’’.1
A particularly important Trump decision, the declaration that the US will pull out
of the Paris agreement on climate action, triggered somewhat more varied
interpretations about leadership effects. The dominant interpretation is that US
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leadership is no longer mandatory on such matters and, therefore, this US decision
will kill neither the Paris agreement nor climate cooperation in general. However,
some commentators stressed—as on the previous issue—how this would strengthen
China geopolitically due to both the gains from leadership status and benefits from
spearheading the clean technology of the future. The respected British newspaper
‘The Guardian’ ran this headline and sub-title: ‘‘Trump’s order signals end of US
dominance in climate change battle. Trump’s climate blitzkrieg is unlikely to herald
the end of civilization, but it risks US geopolitical dominance and could help ‘make
China great again’’’.2
Others, however, emphasized that the Paris agreement was saved through joint
leadership by China and the EU3 as expressed in their joint declaration almost-
agreed on 2 June 2017 (deformalized due to trade disagreements) and expressed in
meetings of the G8 and G20 throughout 2017. This EU–China partnership in turn
prompted different interpretations: is this the new dynamic duo in world politics—
or is it rather the fact that it is an ad-hoc alliance that is the point? The latter
interpretation was reinforced by the 6 July 2017 agreement between the EU and
Japan on bilateral trade. Meanwhile, China’s acceleration and formalization of the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) points more in the direction of cooperation promoted
by a single power. Cases and complexities like these invite a more general, thorough
and systematic investigation of global leadership, which the two consecutive special
issues aspire to move towards: the first issue deals with the general discussions
about international leadership and global governance; and the next one will focus on
international leadership and the role of China.
‘‘Leadership’’ is not a phenomenon that has attracted an enormous amount of
focussed attention in the discipline of International Relations (IR). Simplifying a bit,
scholars have approached it from two starting points, the traditional two privileged
reference points in IR: powerful states and important individuals. From the first
starting point emanates a tradition of testing how much leadership can be stretched
in relation to power. The starting point is that with power comes often an increased
possibility to lead; and some extreme versions of structural realism come close to
reducing leadership to an expression of power. Most IR analyses of leadership,
however, assume both that power is an important basis for leadership and that the
relationship is complex, contingent and non-linear. This has produced studies for
example of how great power attempts to lead have failed, and instances where small
states have been able to exert international leadership. A famous article in this
tradition of ‘also power but not only’ is cited by several contributors to this special
issue: Oran Young’s (1991) article ‘‘Political Leadership and Regime Formation’’
(see also Young 1994). Young distinguishes between three types of leadership:
structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual. The first, structural kind translates
power into leadership; the second entrepreneurial one uses negotiating skills to
broker interests and build consensus on an institutional arrangement, and the third,
intellectual type delivers a way of thinking about the issue that facilitates regime
2 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/mar/28/trump-climate-change-executive-order-us-
dominance-china.
3 Eg. http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-40106281.
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formation. Because the three types in practice are intermingled, a key factor
becomes the interaction among individual leaders. This is the second pole of
theorizing on leadership: what qualities and actions can make an individual
effective as leader.
As evidenced by the articles in this double issue, it is possible to place the
emphasis variably on leadership focused at the state level or at the level of
individuals—or thirdly to fuse the two.
State centred analyses discuss—as in the opening paragraphs of this article—first
of all the current situation in terms of which states are candidates for what
leadership roles: will China become the leader globally, or only one of them or only
regionally? Will the EU? Will leadership generally shift to different constellations
of actors including international organizations, states, movements and NGOs (as
often implied in the terminology of ‘governance’)? The articles by Wæver, Breslin,
Mortensen, Kristensen, Chen et al., Cooper, Pu, Wang, Lin and Sun in these two
issues mostly take this approach, i.e. discussing the conditions and effects of
leadership by particular units, be they specific states or other actors. In contrast, the
articles by Morton, Zhang and Beeson go more into detail on individual leaders who
have played a key role in past and present attempts to forge international
cooperation. In particular, the paper by Zhang looks in detail at the personal
qualities of Trump compared to Obama.
A third possible approach views these two levels as inherently linked, most
interestingly in the manner where the personal qualities of the national leaders are
an important element in constituting state power, i.e. only if the leaders have a
certain moral quality can the state also become powerful and a true leader. Notably,
this argument is mostly made by Chinese contributors to the two issues. This is in
some sense surprising given that it is solidly entrenched in key philosophical
traditions in both Western and Chinese philosophy. However, it seems to have
become marginalized in current Western scholarship, so that the point is made most
strongly in the present issues by Chinese contributors like Chen, Zhou and Wang in
the second issue (volume. 3:1; 2018), and in striking fashion Zhang makes an
argument of this kind by way of a re-reading of Morgenthau and Western realist
theory. In Western thought, it was central from at least Socrates onwards that
personal striving for an excellent character was necessary for achieving true results
including those in politics. All the way along to even a presumably arch-realist
figure like Machiavelli, there is still some complex relationship between personal
morality and political achievement through the concept of virtue, even if (or
actually because) the overall project of Machiavelli to some extent was to relax that
link (Machiavelli 2009). Similarly, in Chinese political thought, as argued in
relation to IR by Yan Xuetong, even—or in his view actually: particularly—a realist
should pay heed to pre-Qin Chinese thinkers who argued that the highest form of
international leadership can only be achieved by a state where the leaders practice
humane authority, neither hegemony nor tyranny (Yan 2011). This ‘third way’
analysis is most clearly represented in the current set of two special issues by
Zhang’s article in this the first issue focusing on the US, and not least by the article
(in the next issue; stay tuned!) by Chen, Zhou and Wang, which explores that
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possibility that China can devise a form of leadership that is sufficiently different
from that of the US to avoid repeating some of its most momentous mistakes.
Instead of re-inventing the wheel, one is often well advised to consider if another
discipline might have done the work already. Beyond the possibilities of going into
general philosophy or various branches of sociology, which is too complex for the
current setting, the most likely operational candidate would be writings on
management and business.4 One of the most influential models here is the so-called
‘‘four frame model’’ that contrasts structural, human resource, political and
symbolic leaderships (Bolman and Deal 2013). This is not dramatically different
from the typology of Young, and generally, ‘leadership’ seems to be an area where
different fields have reached relatively similar conclusions. For instance, a key
element in management studies of leadership is the role of leaders and followers, as
emphasized in IR by Breslin and actualized in his article in the current issue. An
important argument made in the management literature on this point is the role of
followers ‘authorising’ leaders to lead, not only accepting a concrete initiative
(Heifetz 1994). This resonates with parts of the IR literature that appear in several of
the articles here but could deserve to be more fully explored: great powers are often
thought of as the ‘leaders’ internationally, but even in the more ‘social’ take on great
powers by the International Society approach of the English School, most of the
emphasis is on how the great powers regulate collectively amongst themselves who
they admit to the club of great powers (Bull 1977)—less has been done so far on
how the non-great powers react variably to the idea of great powers in general and
to the ‘authority’ of specific great powers to be great.
The articles in these two issues each contains numerous, nuanced arguments and
therefore should be read in their full length, not grasped by a summary.
Nevertheless, we would like to offer a one liner for each. In the first article of
this special issue on ‘‘International Leadership and Global Governance,’’ Ole
Wæver argues: the structure of the international system should prepare us for a
general deficit of leadership and occasional ad-hoc coalitions driven by existential
fears of global dangers and/or a possibility for a nation/polity to build an
international role through leadership, as we saw with the EU and China in relation to
the climate. Katherine Morton both reinforces and challenges the analysis from the
first article by emphasizing the importance for the leadership candidates of custodial
leadership on the main global challenges while pointing to a less state-centric
analysis including more emphasis on individual leaders, bringing some hope for
collaborative leadership. Shaun Breslin extends his previous analysis of the
relationship between leadership and followership pointing to an increased role for
functionalist dynamics in a ‘‘non-polar’’ world of fragmented and shifting
leadership. Biao Zhang takes us back to that last, possibly departing superpower,
the US, and uses a theory developed in the US, Morgenthau’s realism, to present a
checklist of qualities necessary for leadership and predicts how Donald Trump’s
presidency is likely to contribute to chaos and a leaderless world. Jens Ladefoged
Mortensen shifts the focus to International Political Economy, more precisely the
current trading (dis)order, where it is shown how the domestic sources of leadership
4 Thanks to Suzi Lyng Hansen for helpful advice on this.
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are becoming increasingly decisive and how institutional leadership is giving way to
instituationalized leadership in the sense of control over a particular site. Conflicts
between the US and the EU are at the centre of current global competition between
different formats. Peter Marcus Kristensen moves the centre of attention to the
world of scholars, analysing the internal debates among American observers and
scholars of IR, re-reading their debates on the changing global order as expressions
not only of disagreements on the empirical object of analysis but rather as political
moves in a debate, which shows that beneath seemingly neutral terms of leadership
and ‘a leaderless world’ are often criteria for ‘good’ leadership that really means US
leadership, and thus Chinese leadership is really not able to serve as a solution, only
as part of the problem, in this academic set-up. Finally, Mark Beeson draws together
many of the questions that have been addressed in the issue by way of a discussion
of the possibility for Asia–Pacific leadership in a period defined by both US
reluctance under Trump and Chinese strengthening, while it still remains an open
question whether ultimately China has the will and ability to develop a sustained
leadership in Asia.
In the next special issue of this journal, titled ‘‘International Leadership and the
Role of China, volume 3:1 in 2018, the conversation continues. The first article by
Zhimin Chen, Guorong Zhou and Shichen Wang zooms in on the question that the
debate in the previous article pointed towards: Can and will China take on a
leadership role in the world, and if so can it be of a different kind from what has
been practiced especially by the US? The tentative answer based on both theoretical
and empirical analysis (regarding the BRI) points to a possible form of facilitative
leadership that is more collective, attractive, win–win and empowering. Andrew
Cooper and Zhang Yanbing offer a somewhat more conflictual picture of Chinese
leadership, now focused on globally oriented organizations. Their key argument is
that China has practised a dualistic strategy as both insider and outsider in the global
system, becoming both a core member of the ‘hub’ forum the G20 and cultivating a
number of parallel non-Western institutions like the BRICS and BRI. This dualism
serves a number of purposes both internationally and domestically, but it also
presents some important questions in relation to the kind of leadership that China
might offer in the emerging international system. Xiaoyu Pu furthers the exploration
of Chinese international leadership, now with the central contrast being regional
versus global and with the concept of status as a key analytical device. The analysis
points to severe limits to China becoming a solo leader, both regionally and
especially globally, and fortunately also points to ways that status is not always
relative and competitive and, therefore, how it is possible to realize joint gains
through joint leadership. Jue Wang continues the study of actual Chinese leadership,
in this case through collaboration with the IMF. This analysis too points to limits to
future leadership by demonstrating how the actual increase in Chinese influence has
been conditioned by specific circumstances in relation to both the IMF and the US,
where China has had limited effects when these conditions were not fulfilled.
Stefano Burzo and Xiaojun Li move the analytical focus back to a comparative look
at the US and China, bringing public perceptions into the picture. The unique
material in the form of parallel surveys presents a number of surprises, potentially
(with a number of methodological caveats) pointing to an intriguing scenario where
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Americans are actually more open than expected to divided leadership, while the
Chinese might be hampered by a too monolithic conception of leadership as an all-
or-nothing thing. Finally, Sun Xuefeng continues the bi-focal look on US–Chinese
approaches, now with East Asian regional security as a concrete case. Based on the
concept of a ‘rise dilemma’ for China, the article shows how the increasing external
security pressure China has faced has been handled by a state-by-state approach
contingent on the more institutionalized US security system. The interaction
between this Chinese strategy of strategic hedging and varying conditions among
the different neighbours for relating differently to China produces a complex and
nuanced pattern of strategic relationships that defy any easy picture of one power
leading or the other. Finally, Pippa Morgan from Fudan and Peter Marcus
Kristensen from Copenhagen round off the second issue with another joint article
taking stock and pointing into the future, more convincingly and appropriately than
the two of us can do, given that their generation will play a bigger role and has a
greater stake in the future—including the future of global leadership on global
challenges.
This is a fitting conclusion to the combined effort of all the authors contributing
to these two issues as well as various others involved with and contributing to both
the workshop and the publication. The international system is changing in important
ways as a combined effect of system level broad processes and domestic
peculiarities especially in the US and China, some of these coming down to the
character of individual leaders (and actually-not-really-leaders).
Leadership can be good. Often this appears differently to those that lead and
those who are led (and in our day-jobs one of us is mostly on one side of that
distinction, while the other is on the opposite side; hopefully these have made us
sensitive to the full picture). In international affairs, it is widely accepted that quite
often leadership is necessary because the basic structure is decentralised, authority
and power are anchored at the national level and cooperation is only something that
is achieved by effort, not automatically. Arguably, the world will face some
dramatic collective dangers in the coming decade—ranging from climate change
and other technology centred dangers like superhuman machine intelligence over
vulnerabilities to the global economic order to parallel processes of domestic
discontent that erupt into populist self-centredness. As the stakes are growing and
the system is simultaneously becoming more decentralised, any attempt to exercise
leadership is likely to become increasingly controversial and contested—no format
will ‘grow’ forth as a natural process. However, to the extent that several of these
global dangers are at least in broad terms seen as shared concerns (even if the
precise terms are not agreed upon), there will probably be an increasing reward in
terms of social acceptance (authorization) of leaders who are widely perceived to do
something about these issues. Paradoxically, we might therefore end up concluding
that ‘international leadership’ in the coming years will be less about the
international and less about who are the leaders. That is: self-referential concerns
about who leads what regional or global institution or constellation will become less
important, and outcomes less decided by purely interstate issues about who is
willing to accept whom to be how powerful in their relationship, and more
determined by who authorises whom to lead on what issues because this is
Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.
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perceived to actually work. In the future, to be seen as promoting actual solutions
and be willing to deliver one’s own part of the effort will increasingly decide who
comes to embody the leadership of global governance.
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